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THE EDUCATION OF A JUSTICE*
JOEL FRANCIS PASCHAL t
I
G EORGE- SUTHERLAND was an associate justice of the United
States Supreme Court from 1922 to 1938. Even before 1922, James
Bryce had described him as "the living voice of the Constitution."'
Sutherland was indeed the voice of one Constitution. While he was on
the Court no other justice spoke for the majority in so many great cases.2
His influence extended to every sphere of government. If the Constitu-
tion is what the judges say it is, Sutherland was its chief author during
his incumbency. Accordingly, he can be regarded as a representative
figure in a sense which is applicable to but few of the justices who have
served on the Court. As such he retains a special significance for students
* This paper is based on material gathered by the author for a forthcoming book
on the life of George Sutherland.
t B.A.1935, LL.B.1938, Wake Forest; M.A.1942, Ph.D.1948, Princeton. Research
Director, North Carolina Commission for the Improvement of the Administration of
Justice.
IN. Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1922.
2 The following cases, to which others could be added, seem sufficient to prove
the point: Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 Sup.Ct. 597., 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923);
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 43 Sup.Ct. 394, 67 L.Ed. 785 (1923); Eu-
clid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 Sup.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926); Tyson
and Bro. United Theater Ticket Office v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 47 Sup.Ct. 426, 71 I,
Ed. 718 (1927); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 48 Sup.Ct. 5Z, 72 L.Ed. 913 (1928);
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 49 Sup.Ct. 115, 73 L.Ed. 287 (1929); Lig-
gett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 49 Sup.Ot. 57, 73 L.Ed. 204 (1928); Frost v. Cor-
poration Commission of Oklahoma, 278 U.S. 515, 49 Sup.Ct. 235, 73 L.Ed. 483 (1929);
Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U.,. 620, 49 Sup.Ct. 432, 73 L.Ed. 874 (1929):
Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37, 47 Sup.Ct.
522, 71 L.Ed. 916 (1927); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 50 Sup.Ot. 253, 74 L.
Ed. 854 (1930); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 Sup.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932);
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 52 Sup.Ct. 371, 76 L.Ed. 747 (1932);
Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 53 Sup.Ct. 181, 77 L.Ed. 288 (1932); Colgate v.
Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 56 Sup.Ct. 252, 80 L.Vd. 299 (1935); Rathbua v. United States,
295 U.S. 602, 55 Sup.Ct. 869, 79 L.Ed. 1611 (1935); Jones v. Securities & Exchange
Commission, 298 U.S. 1, 56 Sup.Ct. 654, 80 L.Dd. 1015 (1936); Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 Sup.Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1936); United States v. Macintosh,
283 U.S. 605, 51 Sup.Ct. 570, 75 L.Ed. 1302 (1931); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 Sup.Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255 (1936); and United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 57 Sup.Ct 758, 81 L.Ed. 1134 (1937).
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of constitutional law-and this despite the fact that so much of his con-
stitutional philosophy has been discredited.
For teachers in American law schools, Sutherland is of further signifi-
canice since he was in large measure the logical product of his formal
education. His teachers not only supplied him with the ingredients of
the political philosophy which governed his general outlook; they sup-
plied him with specific answers to specific problems. In this, they were
certainly exceptional. Despite the familiar platitudes, it is common ex-
perience that teachers of creative and lasting influence are all too rarely
encountered. How did it happen, then, that Sutherland's teachers exer-
cised such an influence on him?
Basically, I believe, the explanation is dependent on the fact that
they had something significant to say on problems of perennial impor-
tance. They were men of conviction, with values they believed worth
championing. Conviction alone, of course, does not make an effective
teacher. Sutherland's teachers were aided also by their comprehension
of the meaning of their age in the perspective of history. Their success
was almost exactly proportional to this comprehension. They recognized
in the emerging industrialism of their day a potent threat to their politi-
cal philosophy. They did not understand that this philosophy could not,
under modern conditions, attain its objective of securing freedom for
the individual.
Within the limits of their partial understanding of history, however,
theirs was -the maximum achievement. They responded with boldness
and imagination to the threat posed by the new industrialism. They were
not disarmed by the awkward fact that more government seemed a nec-
essity, nor by the Supreme Court's initial disinclination to obstruct the
political processes. Instead, they adhered to their faith in the power of
ideas. For them, law was dynamic, subject to change and influence if
properly approached. Their problem in seeking a change lay, there-
fore, in selecting from the arguments available to them those which rep-
resented significant intellectual currents, not mere surface ripples.
Here precisely is the secret of their triumph as teachers. They made the
vital distinction; of this the Court's capitulation to their views is proof
enough. Even the skeptical must have been shaken by such a perform-
ance. For Sutherland-though he was not so thoroughly susceptible as
one might suppose-the result was lasting conversion.
II
George Sutherland was born of British parents at Stoney Stratford
in Buckinghamshire, England, on March 25, 1862. The circumstance
that he was a native of Great Britain was rendered noteworthy sixty
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years later when he was appointed to the Supreme Court of the United
States. Only three justices before him, and none for over a hundred
years, had been of alien birth.3 His father, Alexander George Suther-
land, was of Scottish descent, belonging to a family which had earlier
lived in Edinburgh, and earlier still in the extreme north of Scotland.
His mother was Frances Slater, a native of England.4 Some time in
1862 Alexander Sutherland espoused the faith of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints, and resolved to emigrate with his new
family to the Promised Land that Brigham Young had found for the
Saints in the Great American Desert. Accordingly, in the summer of
1863, the Sutherlands, aided perhaps by a grant from the Church, aban-
doned England and traveled some five thousand miles to settle in the
little village of Springville, in what is now the state of Utah.'
After a short time Alexander renounced his faith in Joseph Smith's
revelations, but he made no attempt otherwise to retrace his steps. In-
stead he pushed on to Montana as a mining prospector. By 1869, how-
ever, he was back in Utah, settling for a time in Silver City and later
in Provo. His restlessness and the great variety of occupations he pur-
sued suggest that this Sutherland never achieved more than a moderate
economic success. Besides being a prospector for minerals, he was, at
various times, mining recorder, justice of the peace, postmaster, and
practicing attorney." Both parents lived to see their son rise to high
place, the father dying in 1911 and the mother in 1920.7
The Utah of Sutherland's youth, although it had been the home of
the Mormons for two decades, was still a frontier community. Years
later, Sutherland confessed that he was tempted to think of himself as
3 N. Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1922, in a feature story on Sutherland's appointment to the
Court. The other justices of foreign birth were, James Wilson, who was born in
Scotland; James Iredell, who was b3rn in England, and William Paterson, who was
born at sea while his English parents were on their way to America. To these, the
name of David J. Brewer could be added. He was born in Asia Minor but was the
child of American parents. Mr. Justice Frankfurter of the present Court was
born in Austria.
4 Sutherland to Alexander Sutherland (Scotland), Feb. 24, 1937; unpublished bio-
graphical memoir on Sutherland by Alan D. Gray, formerly Sutherland's law clerk
and now of the San Francisco bar. A copy may be found in the office of the Marshal
of the Supreme Court. Mr. Thomas D. Waggaman, the present marshal, informs me
that this memoir was read by Sutherland and approved by him as an accurate state-
ment. The letter referred to, as well as all others used in this article, is from a col-
lection kindly made available to me by the Justice's daughter, Mrs. Walter Bloedorn
of Washington, D. C., and his grandson, Mr. George Sutherland Elmore- of the Dis-
trict of Columbia bar.
5 Salt Lake Herald-Republican, Jan. 12, 1905, where Sutherland's career up to that
time is briefly reviewed. The occasion was his election to the United States Senate.
6 IbiZ.
7 Gray, supra note 4, at 4.
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a- pioneer and added that, if this was not exactly justified, he still
could be called a "pio-nearly." s His boyhood was, in his words,
a period when life was very simple, but, as I can bear testimony, very
hard as measured by present day standards . . . Nobody worried about
child labor. The average boy of ten [undoubtedly referring to himself]
worked-and often worked very hard . . . He milked, cut and carried
in the night's wood, carried swill to the pigs, curried the horses, hoed the
corn, guided the plow or, if not, followed it in the task of picking up pota-
toes which had been upturned, until his young vertebrae approached dis-
location and he was ready to consider a bid to surrender his hopes of
salvation in exchange for the comfort of a hinge in the small of his back.'
Sutherland was not long in acquiring the rudimentary learning avail-
able to him. McGuffey's readers and Webster's blueback spelling book
marked the uppermost bounds of this discipline, and an ability to recite
"The Raven" with "appropriate emphasis and inflection" was the crown-
ing glory."0 By the time he was twelve, Sutherland began to earn his
own living. At that age, he took a job as a clerk in a clothing store in
Salt Lake City. Three years later he became an agent of the Wells-
Fargo Company, and at the same time held a position in the mining re-
corder's office. In 1879 he entered the recently established Brigham
Young Academy at Provo.n
III
This institution, which later became Brigham Young University,
was, of course, an enterprise of the Mormon Church. It was presided
over by a man of compelling force, Karl G. Maeser. To him Suther-
land was always quick to attribute a decisive influence on his life.1"
Maeser was of German birth and had been converted by Mormon mis-
sionaries to Saxony. Except for Brigham Young, he seems to have been
the most powerful of the Mormon leaders. After sixty years had in-
tervened, Sutherlind described him thus:
Dr. Maeser's knowledge seemed to reach into every field. Of course
there were limits; but they were not revealed to me during my course
8 "The Spirit of Brigham Young University," an address prepared by Sutherland
to be read at the commencement exercises of the University on June 4, 1941. It was
reprinted in the University publication, The Messenger, Vol. 18, No. 10. The refer-
ence is to p. 3.
9 Id. at 3-4.
10 I. at 6. For an account of the influence of the McGuffey readers on American
life, see RICHARD D. MOSIER, IAMING THE AMER ICAN MIND: SOCIAL AND MORAL
IDEAS RT THE MCGU=FY READERS (1947). Mosier pictures the readers as exercising
a conservative and nationalist influence.
IL Gray, supra note 4, at 1.
12 Sutherland to James R_. Talmage, Jan. 13, 1927; Sutherland to Reinhard Maeser,
Feb. 26, 1923.
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at the Academy. That he was an accomplished scholar I knew from the
first. But the extent of his learning so grew before my vision as time
went on that my constant emotion was one of amazement. I think there
were days when I would have taken my oath that if the Rosetta Stone
had never been found, nevertheless he could have easily revealed the meaning
of the Egyptian hieroglyphics. He spoke with a decided accent; but his
mastery of the English language, of English literature, and of the English
way of thought, was superb.13
Maeser's influence was not merely that of an instructor. "He was,"
says Sutherland, "a man of such transparent and natural goodness that
his students gained not only knowledge, -but character which is better
than knowledge."' 4  The Academy's atmosphere and the tone- of its in-
struction were definitely religious. Indeed, Brigham Young's single
command to Maeser at the time of its establishment had been: "I do not
want you to attempt even the alphabet or the multiplication table with-
out the spirit of the Lord. That is all."'1 5 To such an ideal Maeser
undoubtedly gave unswerving allegiance, but always in a free and gen-
erous spirit. The non-conforming Sutherland was never made to feel
that his dissent made the slightest difference in the attention he received
or the esteem in which he was held.' 6 He carried with him for the
remainder of his days a vivid and grateful memory of Maeser, acknowl-
edging always that the immigrant Saint had exerted an influence on
his "whole life which can not be exaggerated."' Maeser, for his part,
admired and respected his pupil. He was often heard to remark that
Sutherland's essays were invariably models of excellence, and in later
years his friends speculated that no one would have been less surprised
or more pleased at his pupil's subsequent success.18,
A full outline of Sutherland's course of study at Brigham Young is
not available. It is certain, however, that among other things Maeser
discussed with his students the Constitution of the United States. Years
later, Sutherland approvingly recalled his teaching that a divine hand
had guided the framers.'9 This was in strict conformity with the offi-
cial doctrine of the Church. Indeed, Maeser, had available-and doubt-
less used-the Mormon scriptures to prove his point. Section 101 of
the Doctrine and Covenants quotes the Deity thus:
13 The Spirit of Brigham. Young University, supra note 8, at 8.
14 rd. at 9.
15 .. MLAINUS JENSEN, HISTORY OF PROVO, UTAR 348 (1924).
13 The Spirit of Brigham Young University, supra note 8, at 4.
17 Sutherland to Reinhard Maeser, Feb. 26, 1923.
18 Deseret News, Sept. 6, 1922.
19 Sutherland to Mrs. Jeanette A. Hyde, May 28, 1936.'
1949]
JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION
79. , Therefore, it is not right that any man should be in bondage one to
another.
80. And for this purpose have I established the Constitution of this land,
by the hands of wise men whom I raised up unto this very purpose and
redeemed the land by the shedding of blood.
There were many other texts which Maeser might have quoted to
stimulate in his scholars a reverential feeling for the Constitution. Sec-
tion 98 of the Doctrine and Covenants, for example, contains the fol-
lowing passage:
5. And that law of the land which is constitutional, supporting that
principle of freedom in maintaining rights and privileges, belongs to all
mankind and is justifiable before me.
6. Therefore, I, the Lord, justify you and your brethren of my church,
in befriending that law which is the constitutional law of the land;
7. And as pertaining to law of man, whatsoever is more or less than this
cometh of evil.
8. I, the Lord God, make you free, therefore ye are free indeed; and
the law also maketh you free.
These verses, as Maeser believed, were transmitted to the Mormon
people by means of revelations received by Joseph Smith in the year
1833. Maeser probably also recalled to his students the belief of the
Mormons, voiced by Brigham Young, that some day, when the Consti-
tution should be hanging "upon a single thread," the Faithful would
rush forth to save it.20
It is not mere supposition that the idea of a divinely inspired law
which had for its purpose the freedom of man seared itself into the
consciousness of George Sutherland, although he himself was not of the
Faith. So, too, with the notion of a last-ditch, heroic defense of this
law. More than a half-century later, when it seemed to him that the
Constitution was under attack as never before, he wrote a Mormon
friend that one of his greatest joys had been derived from the Church's
adherence to that document. I-e went on to add:
I can recall, as far back as 1879 and 1880, the words of Professor Maeser,
who declared that [the Constitution] was a divinely inspired instrument
-as I truly think it is.21
Maeser, however much he relied on sacred writings, led his pupils to
an acquaintance with other literature as well. A book published by him
in 1898, entitled School and Fireside, indicates a preoccupation with
20 Tim DIscoursEs oF BRIGHAM YOUNG 553 (1925).
21 Sutherland to 'Mrs. Jeanette A. Hyde, May 28, 1930. 1
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philosophic ideas. It reveals him as a thorough-going believer in the
individualistic doctrines of the nineteenth century. His acceptance of
those doctrines in the realm of educational theory was whote-hearted
and specific. "The fundamental principle of occidental education," he
wrote, "is the development of individuality." To this principle he at-
tributed all progress in "politics, commerce, industry, art, and learn-
ing."2' While placing high value on the works of John Stuart Mill,
he accorded the first place among philosophers to Herbert Spencer. In
a lavish tribute, he termed "this great thinker . . . the peer of
Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Newton, Leibnitz, and Kant."23
Spencerian notions were so much a part of the intellectual atmosphere
of Sutherland's early years that he could not have escaped their in-
fluence altogether,24 and their sponsorship by a revered and seemingly
omniscient teacher rendered them irresistible. Moreover, something
like a cosmic conspiracy seemed to militate against any later apostasy,
for when Sutherland began the study of law at the University of Mich-
igan a few years later, his great teacher, Thomas M. Cooley, was a
Spencerian disciple of the highest standing. So too were the oracles of
the bench and Sutherlan&s companions at the bar. In addition, there
were pouring from the presses during this period countless other justi-
fications of the master's tenets, the most important of which Sutherland
undoubtedly read and absorbed.2
Spencer, then, was not only the initial intellectual influence in Suther-
land's life but a persisting one. He provided a basic philosophy which
served as a celestial guide for Sutherland in his odyssey as lawyer,
legislator, and judge. This philosophy embodied two major conceptions,
each universal in scope and application: evolution and liberty." Spen-
22 I.uM G. IAESER, SCHOOL AND FIRESIDE 32 (1898).
23 Ia. at 29.
24 Spencer's enormous influence in late nineteenth-century America is attested by
both Parrington and the Beards. See MINnu- CUrRENTS OF AmERICAN THOUGHT iii,
197-211 (1939), and THE RISE OF AMERICAI CIVILizATIox ii, 406ff. (1943). It was
also noted by Justice Holmes. "H. Spencer you English never quite do justice to,"
le wrote Lady Pollock in 1895, "or at least those whom .I have talked with do not.
He is dull. He writes an ugly uncharIning style, his ideals are those of a lower middle
class British Philistine. And yet after all abatements I doubt if any writer of Eng-
lish except Darwin has done so much to affect our whole way of thinking about the
universe." HoLmms-POLLocK LETTFns 57-58 (1941).
25 Three, which are fairly representative, are: CHUsTorlIEr. G. TIEDMAN, Tn&T-
ISE ON TnE LinITATIONS OF THE POLICE POWERS (1886) ; JO n FORREST DILLON, LAws
AND JURISPRUDoENCE OF ENGLAxD AND AMERICA (1894); JOHN R-A.NDOLPI TUCKER,
TREATISE OL THE CoSTITUTIOxk (1899). In his Senate days, Sutherland often used
"Mr. Tucker" to prove a point.
26 The discussion of Spencer which follows is drawn from his SOCIAL STATICs and
TIE MAN VEBSUs THE STATE. I have also used HvUGH ELLIOT, HERBERT SPENCER
(1917), T. J. C. HEARNSHAW, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THINKERS OF THE VICTORIAN ERA
(1933), and ERNEST BARKER, POLITICAtL THOUGIT IN ENGLAND lMROM HERBERT SPEN-
CER TO THE PRESENT DAY (1915).
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cer believed that man, society, and the state were all results of an im-
measurably lengthy growth, and that this process was to be continued to
the end of time. The dynamic force was supplied by the principle of
adaptation. Spencer held that every organism contains within itself an
undeniable impluse urging the establishment of harmony with its en-
vironment. He insisted that
whatever possesses vitality, from the elementary cell up to man himself,
obeys this law . . . [Man] alters in cblour according to temperature
. . . gets larger digestive organs if he habitually eats innutritious
food-acquires the power of long fasting if his mode of life is irregular,
and loses it when the supply of food is certain-becomes fleet and agile
in the wilderness and inert in the. city-attains acute vision, hearing,
and scent, when his habits of life call for them, and gets these senses
blunted when they are less needful.2 7
So important to Spencer was this adaptive process that he made it the
sole criterion of good and evil. That which encouraged adaptation was
good; that which prevented it evil. If some outside agency should pre-
vent the necessary adjustments, the result must surely be death and ob-
livion.
The second idea, that of liberty, proclaimed the freedom of the in-
dividual to effect the adaptation which nature demands. Individual hap-
piness, in Spencer's view, was not to be found in externals; rather it was
the result of the satisfaction of certain inner cravings, of self-realiza-
tion. 8  Accordingly, the essential condition of happiness was the liberty
to satisfy these cravings by the exercise of the faculties of adaptation.
Given free play, and unimpeded by outside interference, these faculties
were certain to produce, of their own force, a state of perfect equipoise
and bliss. Spencer asserted that
progress, therefore, is not an accident, but a necessity. Instead of civilization
being artificial, it is a part of nature; all of a piece with the development
of the embryo or the unfolding of a flower. The modifications mankind
have undergone, and are still undergoing, result from a law underlying
the whole organic creation; . . . As surely as the tree becomes
bulky when it stands alone, and slender if one of a group; as surely as
the same creature assumes the different forms of cart-horse and race-
horse, according as its habits demand strength or speed; as surely as
a blacksmith's arm grows large and the skin of a labourer's hand thick;
as surely as the eye tends to become long-sighted in the sailor, and short-
sighted in the student; . . . as surely as the musician learns to
27 HFRBERT SpENCER, SOCIAL STATICS 74-75 (1883).
28 Cf. Knight, DetermiriUm, "Freedom," and Psychotherapy, 9 PayomATmy 251
(1946), for a recent statement of a similar idea.
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detect an error of a semitone amidst what seems to others a very babel
of sounds; as surely as a passion grows by indulgence and diminishes
when restrained; as surely as there is any efficacy in educa-
tional culture, or any meaning in such terms as habit, custom, practice;
so surely must the human faculties be moulded into complete fitness for
the 'social state; so surely must the things we call evil and immorality
disappear; so surely must man become perfect,29
The evolutionary progress toward a society capable of highest hap-
piness was cruel, unrelenting, inevitable:
Pervading all nature we may see at work a stern discipline, which is a little
cruel that it may be very kind . . The poverty of the incapable,
the distresses that come upon the imprudent, the starvation of the idle,
and those shoulderings aside of the weak by the strong, which leave so many
"in shallows and in miseries," are the decrees of a large, far-seeing benevo-
lence.
Power of application must be developed; such modification of the intellect
as shall qualify it for its new tasks must take place; and, above all, there
must be gained the ability to sacrifice a small immediate gratification for
a future great one. The state of transition will of course be an unhappy
state. Misery inevitably results from incongruity between constitution and
qonditions. All these evils, which afflict us, and seem to the uninitiated
the obvious consequences of this or that removable cause, are unavoidable
attendants on the adaptation now in progress. Humanity is being pressed
against the inexorable necessities of its new position-is being moulded into
harmony with them, and has to bear the resulting unhappiness as best it can.
The process must be undergone, and the sufferings must be endured. No
power on earth, no cunningly-devised laws of statesmen, no world-rectifying
schemes of the humane, no communist panaceas, no reforms that men ever
did broach or ever will broach, can diminish them one jot. . 3
For Spencer, the state was the result of the great increase in pop-
ulation, which had produced a condition in which individuals, in fol-
lowing their adaptive urges, had begun to run afoul of each other.
The state emphatically was not the result of a social quality in man.
On the contrary, Spencer supposed that man was by nature solitary.
29 SPENCER, op. cit. supra note 27, at 80.
30 Id. at 352-356. Of. Sutherland's remarks in 1937: "The world is passing through
an uncomfortable experience; and in many respects. will have to retrace its steps
with painful effort. The tendency of many governments is in the direction of de-
stroying individual initiative, self-reliance, and other cardinal virtues whicit. I _Twa
always taught were necessary to develop a real democracy. The notion that the
individual is not to have the full reward of what he does well, and is not to bear
the responsibility for what he does badly, apparently is becoming part of our pres-
ent philosophy of government." Sutherland to Henry M. Bates, April 21, 1937. Ital-
ics supplied.
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Instead of desiring companionship, he wished nothing so much as to be
left alone. That man still contained within himself vestiges of this
aboriginal predilection for solitude, and had not perfectly adapted him-
self to the relatively new requirements of the social state, rendered in-
evitable by the growth of numbers-this was the all-sufficient explana-
tion for the existence of evil, sorrow, and pain.
Since Spencer believed that the state was unnatural, and represented
a deviation from the law of liberty, he was adamant in declaring that its
activities should be limited to the adjustment of the difficulties which had
made it seem desirable. The overcrowding of the earth had presented a
new situation. Men were confronted with the alternatives of society or
perpetual war. The role of the state, therefore, was to make society
possible "by retaining men in the circumstances to which they are to be
adapted." When its true function of securing the adaptive process had
been discharged, and man's nature had become reconciled to society, the
state was destined to wither away and to appear ultimately as the crude
expedient of a primitive age.
In such a philosophy, the role of the state was plainly confined to
the settlement of disputes and the preservation of order. Justice was to
be discovered by harking back to the original rights of man as they ex-
isted before the state had become necessary. Its administration was to be
motivated by a desire to maintain, in so far as possible, all the privileges
man had enjoyed in his original solitary condition. This was in accord-
ance with the theory that man, by becoming a member of society, had
surrendered no right save that of acting in a manner incompatible with
the equal liberty of others.
Spencer, therefore, was certain that when the state passed beyond
these confines and attempted meliorative functions it was straying from
its true purposes. Moreover, any such attempt was bound to fail; since
the evils which the state might seek to rectify resulted entirely from
non-adaptation, the only remedy was adaptation, which interference by
the state tended to prevent. For example, Spencer believed that any
contribution by the state to the relief of the poor was not only an un-
justifiable spoliation of the wealthier classes, on whom the burden
would fall, but an essay in futility as well. "It defeats its own end," he
declared:
Instead of diminishing suffering, it eventually increases it. It favors the
multiplication of those worst fitted for existence, and, by consequence,
hinders the multiplication of those best fitted for existence-leaving, as it
does, less room for them. It tends to fill the world with those to whoni
life will bring most pain, and tends to keep out of it those to whom life
[VOL. I
THE EDUCATION OF A JUSTICE
-will bring most pleasure. It inflicts positive misery, and prevents positive
happiness. 31
Although the state was thus faced with certain failure when it en-
croached on forbidden territory, this failure was not the only price
exacted for the disregard of eternal truths. The assignment of one func-
tion to one organ was an essential condition of the highest efficiency.
Accordingly, when the state embarked on tasks outside its role of pre-
serving order, there was necessarily a diminution of its ability to per-
form its legitimate mission. Moreover, such adventures only whetted
the appetites of legislators. Once the first forbidden step was taken,
there was sure to be pressure to follow it with others: "The State's mis-
doings become . . . reasons for praying it to do more!" "
Enough has been said to show that Spencer believed that the state
should be a wholly negative force of police, limiting its activities to en-
forcing contracts, suppressing insurrection, and repelling foreign inva-
sion. It had no warrant for controlling education, for promoting com-
merce and industry, nor even for enforcing sanitation. Furthermore,
once a mistake had been made it was vain to think that it could be recti-
fied by more legislation. "Nature will not be cheated," he declared:
Every jot of the evil must in one way or other be borne-consciously or un-
consciously; either in a shape that is recognized, or else under some disguise.
No philosopher's stone of a constitution can produce golden conduct from
leaden instincts. No apparatus of senator, judges, and police can com-
pensate for the want of an internal governing sentiment. No legislative
manipulation can eke out an insufficient morality into a sufficient one.33
Forms of government were therefore not considered to be of much
importance. Whatever the form and wherever the sovereign power lay,
government was perforce the inevitable enemy of liberty. "The divine
right of majorities" he attacked as a superstition no less pernicious than
that of the divine right of kings.' Certainly a majority should have
:absolute dominion in those matters which called forth the state, but be-
yond this it had not the slightest authority. In all other matters the
right of resistance remained to each citizen, even though he should stand
alone against the world. Liberty, not majority rule, was held to be the
31 I. at 416.
32 HERBERT SpiEECER, TuE M,%"N, VERSUS TILE STATE 97 (1944). A similar idea was
voiced repeatedly by Sutherland. Cf., for example: "Subversions [of the Constitu-
tion] are . . . fraught with the danger that, having begun 'on the ground of
necessity, they will continue on the score of expediency, and, finally, as a mere mat-
ter of course." Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445, 47 Sup.Ct. 426, 71 L.Ed.
718 (1927).
33 SPENCER, op. cit. sapra note 27, at 295-296.
34 SPENCER, op. cit. supr'a note 32, at 174ff.
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true index of democracy. The man of genuine democratic feelings was
said to love freedom "as a miser loves gold, for its own sake and quite
irrespective of its advantages. . . . Flimsy excuses about 'exigen-
cies of the state,' and the like, can not trap him into [acts] of self-
stultification."35
The evidence that Spencer exerted a decisive influence on Sutherland
is not confined to the fact that Maeser was such an unquestioning dis-
ciple nor to Sutherland's repeated acknowledgment of his debt to Mae-
ser. The remarkable correspondence between Spencer's views and those
expressed by Sutherland throughout his public career leaves no room
for doubt. For Sutherland, as for Spencer,
the liberty of the individual to control his own conduct is the most precious
possession of a democracy and interference with it is seldom justified
. . .If widely indulged, such interference will not only fail to bring
about the good results intended, but will gravely threaten the stability and
further development of that sturdy individualism, to which is due more than
any other thing our present advanced civilization.3
Sutherland likewise accepted the Spencerian theory of inevitable pro-
gress. In 1907, for example, he spoke to the Senate of a "law of
evolution" to which "every thing in the universe" is subject. He con-
tinued:
I am glad to believe that in some way I do not understand there is at the
very heart of things some mighty power which silently and surely, if slowly,
works for. the exaltation and uplifting of all mankind. I am not religious
in the ordinary acceptation of the term; I have no patience with mere
forms or mere creeds or mere ceremonies; but I do believe with all the
strength of my soul that "there is a power in the universe, not ourselves,
which makes for righteousness." I am an optimist in all things. I do not
believe that the world is getting worse. I feel sure it is getting better all the
time.
I am no believer in the fall of man. Man has not fallen. He has risen and
will rise.. In the process of evolution he has so far progressed that he is
able to stand erect and look upward . . . and so while he sees the
heights he ascends them only with slow and toilsome effort. But he does
ascend. .
There are occasional lapses, the goings forward and the slippings back, the
fallings down and the risings up, and, thank God, the . . . ultimate
triumph if the resolution be sound at the core.37
Most important of all, however, is Sutherland's adherence as a jus-
tice of the Supreme Court to Spencer's views on the correction of social
35 SPEN cER, op. cit. supra note 27, at 268-269.
30 Private Rights an Government Control, 42 A.B.A.RrE. 197, 202 (1917).
3741 CoNG.RZe. 1499 (1907).
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maladies. A single illustration will suffice: the dissent in the Minnesota
Moratori-m case.38 To begin with, Sutherland believed that the prob-
lem faced by debtors such as Blaisdell was due to their own "indi~cretion
and imprudence." The malady from which they were suffering was not
a social one at all. Their difficulties could not be "relieved by legisla-
tion," and could be prevented only by an assurance "that a full compli-
ance with contracts would be exacted." The problem faced by the Blais-
dells was for Sutherland the Spencerian bogey of non-adaptation. In
his view, they should be forced to adapt or perish. "Policy and human-
ity" were dangerous guides in such a situation. After all, said he:
The present exigency is nothing new. rrom the beginning of our existence
as a nation, periods of depression, of industrial failure, of financial distress,
of unpaid and unpayable indebtedness, have alternated with years of plenty.
The vital lesson that expenditure beyond income begets poverty, that public
or private extravagance, financed by promises to pay, either must end in
complete or partial repudiation or the promises be fulfilled by self-denial
and painful effort, though constantly taught by bitter experience, seems never
to have been learned. . 3
Sutherland seems to have derived more than ideas from Spencer. To
a degree, he appropriated his cold, impersonal style, and to a still greater
extent he appropriated the Spencerian method. For all the data with
which he buttressed his arguments, Spencer was not concerned primarily
with facts, nor did they furnish him his point of departure. Instead, he
began with a theory to which the facts must necessarily conform When
they did not conform, it was because the essential ones had not been dis-
covered. This deductive method was characteristic of Sutherland. His
calm dismissal, in the Adkins case,4" of the factual evidence which
seemed to demonstrate the desirability of a minimum-wage law is one
of the most striking examples. Such evidence, declared Sutherland, was
"interesting but only mildly persuasive." As he explained it, the appar-
ent gain attributed to the minimum wage statutes was "quite probably
S..due to other causes." Facts which did not conform to the
Spencerian theory of struggle could not be accepted. Instead, he called
for evidence in terms of that theory:
No real test of the economic value of the law can be had during periods of
maximum employment . . That will come in periods of depression
and struggle for employment, when the efficient will be employed at the mini-
mum rate, while the less capable may not be employed at all.41
38 Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blalsdell, 290 U.S. 898, 54 Sup.Ct. 231, 78 L.Ed.
413 (1934).
39 Id. at 471-472.
40 261 U.S. 525, 43 Sup.Ct. 394, 67 L.Ed. 785 (1923).
41 I. at 560.
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IV
.Sutherland left the Brigham Young Academy in the summer of 1881
when he became forwarding agent for the contractors building the Rio
Grande Western Railroad.4" Fifteen months later he made the long trip
to Ann Arbor to enter the University of Michigan Law School. When,
Sutherland matriculated, the Michigan Law School was riding the crest
of a nationwide fame. Its students came from all parts of the country
in response to a catholic invitation which excluded only those tinder
eighteen years of age and those unable to furnish "certificates giving
satisfactory evidence of good moral character." The dean of the school
was the celebrated judge and scholar, Thomas McIntyre Cooley. Of
almost equal eminence was James Valentine Campbell, Chief Justice of
the Michigan Supreme Court, who was also a member of the faculty for
many years.
The system of instruction was simple, consisting only of lectures and
moot-court work.43 There were ten lectures a week of an hour each.
No subject required more than thirty lectures for its exposition, and
several were disposed of with only one or two. Although a state insti-
tution, the law school put no particular emphasis on Michigan law and
procedure, but strove, by the inculcation of general principles, to equip its
graduates to practice in any common-law jurisdiction.
In Sutherland's day the curriculum included two courses relating to
constitutional law and theory. The first was given by Judge Campbell
under the general heading, "The Jurisprudence of the United States."
Later Cooley lectured on the general principles of constitutional law.
After each lecture the two judges entered in their record book the
subjects covered. From these titles and from student notebooks it is
possible to get a fairly precise idea of the nature of the instruction and
its content. Campbell gave thirty-one lectures, all of which dealt with
the Constitution and laws of the United States.44  He confined himself,
42 Gray, supra note 4, at 2.
43 The material in this and the following paragraphs is taken from the record
book kept by the faculty and the notebooks of De Forrest Paine, Alexander Hamil-
ton, Jr., and Marshall Davis Ewell, students in the Law School in this period.
The record book and the notebooks are in the University of Michigan libraries. I
should like to acknowledge here the assistance given me in the use of these materi-
als by Dean B. Blythe Stason.
44 The lecture topics as recorded by Campbell for the term Sutherland was in his
class were: Lectures Introductory to United States Jurisprudence; Historical An-
tecedents; Legal Position of the Continental Congress; Defects of the Articles of
Confederation; General Purposes of United States Constitution; Some Special Con-
siderations; Some Restrictions on State Action; Bills of Credit-Retrospective
Laws; Protection of Contracts; Judgments and Other Public Acts; Rights of
Citizens; Sources of United States Law; United States Law-Places Subject to
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on the whole, to particulars, but he made one highly significant excursion
into the realm of constitutional theory. This had to do with the foreign
relations power-the field in which Sutherland won a lasting pre-emin-
ence with his opinion in the Curtiss-Wright case."5  There, it will be re-
called, he expressed for the Court the view that the foreign relations
power, not being dependent on the Constitution, is not limited by its
provisions.
There can be little doubt that it was Campbell who planted such an
idea in Sutherland's mind. In his lectures, the Chief Justice hammered
home to his students what one of them characterized as "his one-sided
view of the separation of the colonies from Great Britain. ' 46  What this
"one-sided view" was appears in the following quotations from student
notebooks recording Campbell's remarks:
In 1774 the Colonies were joined in anticipation of a war with Great Britain
which broke out in 1775 and resulted in their independence.
The Congress of 1774 answers to nothing today except our convention and
was nothing more or less than a popular assembly.
In 1775 they acted as a government and took necessary steps to carry on war
and their power was at once recognized, and this Congress took the respon-
sibility, of declaring the independence of the thirteen colonies without even
consulting their constituents. At the suggestion of Congress the colonies
organized their state governments.4 7
The first Congress represented the colonies and the people; but not the gov-
ernments of the colonies viz. The colonies in the first Congress were not
represented as they are now. They did many things in the first Congress
that would not be allowed to Congress now. It is impossible in case of war
not to interfere with the relations of other governments. Therefore there
must be some tribunal or committee which should represent the American
people in war, as in 1776, in reference to foreign nations; to hold the people
together under one head. Congress was therefore a revolutionary power,
and took all the duties of government upon it.4 8
U. S. Jurisdiction; Law of Nations; Law of Nations; Same Subject; Law of Na-
tions concluded; Congressional Power; Regulation of Commerce; Naturalization;
Bankruptcy; Post Office; Coinage; Maritime Offenses; Copyright; Copyright;
Patents; Patents; Patents; Patents; Judicial System of the United States; Judicial
Power; United States Courts; Judicial System of United States concluded.
45 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 Sup.Ct. 216, 81
L.Ed. 255 (1936).
46 Manuscript notebook of Alexander Hamilton, Jr. 96 (1880). No notebook is avail-
able covering the exact period when Sutherland was in attendance at the University,
but it is reasonable to assume he heard what earlier students had been told.
47 Manuscript notebook of larshall Davis Mvell 8 (1866).
48H amilton notebook 156 (1880).
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No state either before or after the revolution has ever been regarded as a
nation. Before the revolution the colonies expected Parliament to regulate
national affairs. The government of the United States in fact preceded the
present state governments. 49
Discussing the situation as it exists under the Constitution, Campbell
laid great stress on the continued applicability of the law of nations.
He told his students:
The implications of knowledge of laws in the Constitution are from 1st the
law of nations . . . rules applying to all governments of whatever
kind without which no government can exist. . . . In our own govern-
ment we must possess every power that has been found to be absolutely
necessary to all other nations. A nation may be regarded in two lights:
first as to its duties to other nations and second as to its duties to its inhabit-
ants; and these two relations must harmonize in order to have prosperity
in the nation.
The law of nations does not deal with internal duties but external, and there
must somewhere be a power to regulate the external as well as the internal
relations of a nation.50
Finally, Campbell had a word on the duty of the courts. judges, he
said,
cannot question the power that makes a treaty. It is only their duty to en-
force. It is wholly political and not in the least judicial.5 '
How completely Sutherland followed Campbell can be seen by glanc-
ing briefly at his opinion in the Curtiss-Wright case, where he asserted:
The two classes of powers [internal and external] are different, both in
respect of their origin and their nature. The broad statement that the federal
government can exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in
the Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to
carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in re-
spect of our internal affairs. In that field, the primary purpose of the Con-
stitution was to carve from the general mass of legislative powers then pos-
sessed by the states such portions as it was thought desirable to vest in the
federal government, leaving those not included in the enumeration still in
the states. . - . That this doctrine applies only to powers which the
states had, is self-evident And since the states severally never possessed
international powers, such powers could not have been carved from the mass
of state powers but obviously were transmitted to the United States from
some other source. During the colonial period, those powers were possessed
exclusively by and were entirely under the control of the Crown. By the
49 Manuscript notebook of De Forrest Paine 259 (1872).
50 Ewell notebook 6-7 (1866).
5 Paine notebook 280 (1872).
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Declaration of Independence, "the Representatives of the United States of
America" declared the United [not the several] Colonies to be free and in-
dependent states, and as such to have "full Power to levy War, conclude
Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce and to do all other Acts and
Things which Independent States may of right do."
As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies acting
as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from the Crown not
to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their collective and corporate
capacity as the United States of America. Even before the Declaration, the
colonies were a unit in foreign affairs, acting through a common agency-
namely the Continental Congress, composed of delegates from the thirteen
colonies. That agency exercised the powers of war and peace, raised an
army, created a navy, and finally adopted the Declaration of Independence.
Rulers come and go; governments end and forms of government change;
but sovereignty survives. A political society cannot endure without a su-
preme will somewhere. Sovereignty is never held in suspense. When, there-
fore, the external sovereignty of Great Britain in respect of the colonies
ceased, it immediately passed to the Union. That fact was given, practical
application almost at once. The treaty of peace, made on September 23,
1783, was concluded between his Britannic Majesty and the "United States
of America."
It results that the investment of the federal government with the powers of
external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Con-
stitution. The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make
treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had
never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal
government as necessary concomitants of nationality. . . . As a member
of the family of nations, the right and power of the United Statis in that field
are equal to the right and power of the other members of the international
family. Otherwise, the United States is not completely sovereign. 52
The foregoing material convincingly supports the thesis :that Camp-
bell was largely responsible for the opinion in the Curtiss-Wright case.
Of course, his interpretation of Revolutionary history was not original
with him. Justice Story took much the same view in- his Commentar-
ies2r3 and Abraham Lincoln,' 4 George Bancroft,55 and Von Holst 5 gave
it popular currency. Yet it was Campbell's advocacy that proved de-
cisive. Sutherland's complete acceptance of his views is one of the
52 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., supra note 45, at 315-318.
53 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE COXSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
144-167 (5th ed. 1873).
54 In his famous message to Congress on July 4, 1801. See RICHA-DSOX, MESSAGE-
AN PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3228 (1897).
55 See generally his HISTORY OF TE UNITED STATES OF A..mERIoA, vols. 4 and 5.
5 H. VOIT HOLST, TiE CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF the UNITED
STATES 1-64 (1889).
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clearest and most dramatic examples in our history of the power and re-
sponsibility of the teacher.5
At Michigan, in Sutherland's day, the exposition of the greater part
of constitutional theory was reserved, appropriately, to Cooley.58 In
1882, when Sutherland was his student, Cooley was conceded to be the
"greatest American writer on Constitutional Law" and "the most fre-
quently quoted authority." 9 In 1868 he had published his great Treatise
on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative Pow-
er of the States of the American Union.6" Cooley's design is suggested
by the title of his book. The Treatise is concerned with limitations, and
in the Preface Cooley specifically avowed his "sympathy with the re-
straints which the caution of the fathers has imposed upon the exercise
of the powers of government." 6' In his definition he made it quite clear
that the state was a voluntary association of individuals for their own
advantage."' He was careful to point out that individual rights were
antecedent to both states and constitutions, and that the latter did not
"measure the rights of the governed." 03 He quoted with approval the
following excerpt from a Missouri case:
51 It is likely that Sutherland got much more from Campbell than I have Indicated.
In 190D, for example, he offered the Senate a method of constitutional Interpretation
drawn almost verbatim from Campbell's lectures. See 44 CoNo.REc. 2080-2081
(1909).
58 The Cooley lecture topics were: Introductory Address; Introduction to Con-
stitutional Law; General Principles and Definitions; The Same Subject; The Char-
ters of English Constitutional Liberty; The Same Subject; General Prlnciple of
Constitutional Right; The Same Subject; General Principles-The Right of Revolu-
tion; Territorial Government-Steps in the Formation of States; The Putlose in
Forming a Constitution and Apportionment of Powers; The Checks and Balances
of Government-Judicial Powers and Their Finality; the Apportionment of Power
by State Constitutions; The Same Subject; Power of the Legislative Department-
Vested Rights and Its Control in Respect to Them; The Same Subject-Control of
Remedies; Vested Rights-Retrospective Laws; Legislative Control of Estates;
Domestic Relations; Due Process of Law; Protection to Civil Liberty by State
Constitutions; The Same Subject; Religious Liberty; Protection In Liberty and
Property against Unwarranted Judicial Action; Political Rights-the Right to
Assemble and Discuss Public Affairs: To Petition, To Bear Arms; The Liberty of
Speech and of the Press; Appropriation of Private Property to Public Use-Un-
der the War Power; Under the Treaty Making Power; The Power of Taxation and
the Restriction Upon It; Constitutional Protection of Private Property-Appropria-
tion of Private Property to Public Use; The Same Subject. In the discussion of
Cooley which follows, for purposes of clarity and convenience I rely on his Consti-
tutionaZ Limitations rather than the student notebooks. The same material gener-
ally was presented in the lectures as in the book.
59 BENJAnI R. TWlSS, LAWYERS AIND the CONSTITUTION 34-35 (1942), quoting front
I G. J. OLA!nK, LIFE SKETCHES OF EMINENT LAwYER 204 (1895).
60 Edward S. Corwin has said that Cooley's book is "the most Influential treatise
ever published on American constitutional law." See his LmBnrTYi AGAINST GOVERN-
MENT 116 (1948).
61 TnOLAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 12 (Ist ed. 1868).
62 THOMAS M. COOLEY, COXSTITUTIOIqAL LnrrTATIoNs I (7th ed. 1003).
63 1d. at 68.
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What is a constitution and what are its objects? It is easier to tell what it is
not than wllat it is. It is not the beginning of a community, nor the origin
.of private rights; it is not the fountain of law, nor the incipient state of
government; it is not the cause, but the consequence of personal and political
freedom; it grants no rights to the people, but is the creature of their power,
the instrument of their convenience. Designed for their protection in the
enjoyment of the rights which they possessed before the constitution was
made, it is but the framework of the political government, and based upon
the pre-existing condition of law, rights, habits, and modes of thought.
There is nothing primitive in it: it is all derived from a known source. It
presupposes an organized society, law and order, property, personal free-
-dom, a love of political liberty, and enough of cultivated intelligence to know
how to guard it against the encroachments of tyranny. A written consti-
tution is in every instance a limitation upon the powers of government in
the hands of agents; for there never was a written republican constitution
which delegated to functionaries all the latent powers which lie dormant in
every nation and ar-e boundless in extent and incapable of definition."
From such a conception of the Constitution, it was easy for Cooley
to argue that large areas were protected by the "law of the land" from
the depredations of legislatures. The plain design of this law was to
exclude "arbitrary power from *every branch of the government."'
"The principles upon which process is based" and not "any considerations
of mere form" were to determine whether "due process" had been ob-
served."6 Vested rights were not to be thought of in "any narrow or
technical sense," but rather as implying an interest "which it is right
and equitable that the government should recognize and protect, and of
which the individual could not be deprived arbitrarily without injus-
tice."617
In sketching the bounds of permissible legislative action, Cooley re-
garded as fundamental the axiom that "equality of rights, privileges, and
capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law.""8  If some
people should be deprived of their capacity to contract, it could "scarcely
be doubted that the act would transcend the due bounds of legislative
power, even though no express constitutional provision could be pointed
out with which it would come in conflict." 69 Cooley then advanced the
thought-one his pupil committed to memory for use years later-that
those who sought to justify such deprivations "ought to be able to show
a specific authority therefor, instead of calling upon others to show how
(4 Ha2milton v. St. Louis County Court, 15 Mo. 1, 13 (1851). The italics are added.
65 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 62, at 504.
Go Id. at 505.
67 Id. at 508.
68 Id. at 562.
G9 Id. at 561.
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and where the authority is negatived." 0 The police power was said to,
extend only to the enactment of "those rules of good manners and good
neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and tG
insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own so far as is rea-
sonably consistent with a like enjoyment of rights by others." 71 It did
not include a general power to regulate prices, as such an exertion by
the state was held to be "inconsistent with constitutional liberty." 72
On this point the professor had to contend with the recently decided
case of Munn v. Illinois,7" in which the Supreme Court sustained the
regulation of storage charges in grain elevators. His point of attack was
that eventually used by tfie Court and by Sutherland himself-an em-
phasis on Chief Justice Waite's rather superfluous quotation from Lord
Hale, that businesses "affected with a public interest" could be regulat-
ed. Cooley commented:
The mere fact that the public have an interest in the existence of the business,
and are accommodated by it, can not be sufficient, for that would subject the
stock of the merchant, and his charges, to public regulation. The public have
an interest in every business in which an individual offers his wares, his
merchandise, his services, or his accommodations to the public; but his offer
does not place him at the mercy of the public in respect to charges and
prices.74
Businesses were affected with a public interest, in the constitutional
sense, only when they derived some unusual advantage from the state.
Such was Sutherland's introduction to the formal study of the Con-
stitution. As he had learned from Spencer that laissez faire had a cos-
mic sanction and application, just so he derived from Cooley the convic-
tion that the Constitution affirmed this truth. Indeed, this harmony was
so perfect that Sutherland was constrained to believe with Professor
Maeser that it was the result of divine intervention.
When, after forty years, Sutherland became a justice of the Supreme
Court, his opinions echoed the ideas of his preceptor. If it was a ques-
tion of regulating the prices charged by theatre ticket brokers, Suther-
land could answer that:
70 "Freedom of contract is . . the general rule and restraint the excep-
tion." Sutherland for the Court In Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 201 U.S. 52Z,
546, 43 Sup.Ct. 394, 67 L.Ed. 785 (1923).
71 CooLEY, op. cit. supra note 62, at 829.
72 Id. at 870.
73 94 U.S. 113, 24 L.Ed. 77 (1877).
74 CooLEY, op. cit. supra note 62, at 872-87&
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It may be true that, among the Greeks, amusement and instruc-
-tion of people through the drama was one of the duties of government. But
-certainly no such duty devolves upon any American government."
If the question was regulation of the ice industry in the state of Okla-
homa, he could respond:
Here we are dealing with an ordinary business . . . It is a business
.as essentially private in its nature as the business of the grocer, "the dairyman,
the butcher, the baker, the shoemaker, or the tailor, each of whom performs
.a service which . . . the community is dependent upon
but which bears no such relation to the public as to warrant its inclusion
in the category of businesses charged with a public use. It may be quite true
that in Oklahoma ice is not only an article of prime necessity, but indis-
pensable; but certainly not more so than food or clothing or the shelter of
.a home. 76
Again, if the nature and broad purposes of the Constitution were being
.discussed, Sutherland could quote Cooley directly:
It is with special reference to the varying moods of public opinion, and with
a view to putting the fundamentals of government beyond their control,
that these instruments are framed; and there can be no steady and imper-
ceptible change in their rules as inheres in the principles of the common
law . . . A court or a legislature which should allow a change in
public sentiment to influence it in giving a written constitution a construction
not warranted by the intention of its founders, would be justly chargeable
with reckless disregard of official oath and public duty . . What a
-court is to do, therefore, is to declare the law as wiitten . . . The
meaning of the Constitution is fixed when it is adopted."7
The magnitude of Sutherland's debt to Cooley is perhaps best illustrat-
-ed by one of the few instances in which he decided in favor of the claims
-of governmental power-the zoning case of Euclid v. Ambler.3 There,
it will be recalled, Sutherland broke away from his conservative col-
leagues to write the opinion of the Court sustaining the challenged ordi-
nance. Since the ordinance was doubtless the result, in part, of the heavy
-concentration of population in the Cleveland area, the Justice could see
some general theoretical justification for it. From Cooley he was able to
75 Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 278 U.S. 418, 441, 47 Sup.Ot. 426, 71 L.Ed. 718 (1927).
76 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 52 Sup.Ct. 371, 76 IEd. 747 (1932).
77 COOLY E, op. cit supra note 62, at 88-89, quoted by Sutherland in Home Building
and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, supra note 38, at 452. Sutherland omitted the
following passage: "The violence of public passion is quite as likely to be in
the direction of oppression as in any other; and the necessity for bills of rights in
our fundamental laws lies mainly in the danger that the legislature will be in-
fuenced, by temporary excitements and passions among the people, to adopt oppres-
:sive enactments."
7@ 272 U.S. 865, 47 Sup.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926).
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draw a specific legal argument. The professor had called attention to
the "line between what would be a clear invasion of right on the one
hand, and regulations not lessening the value of the right, and calculat-
ed for the benefit of all." 9 In his opinion sustaining the zoning ordi-
nance, Sutherland made it clear that he believed the law would not lessen
the value of any right. He concluded, therefore, that "it cannot be said
that the landowner has suffered or is threatened with an injury" which
gave him standing to clallenge the statute."0
V
The capstone of Sutherland's education was supplied by the Supreme
Court of the United States. The first thirty-five years of his life al-
most exactly paralleled the development whereby the Court was won
to the ideology of laissez faire. Maeser and Cooley were conclusively
proved to have been right. This spectacular vindication of the faith
affected the beliefs of people considerably less susceptible than Suther-
land. In his case, it remained a vital influence until his death. It must
be considered, therefore, if only summarily.
The major prophet on the Court of the new day was Stephen J.
Field,' who was to wrest from John Marshall the record for tenure.
In the course of his long career as a justice, Field eventually won an im-
pressive victory in persuading the Court to abandon its more or less tol-
erant view of legislative action. Field's substitute was a theory of su-
pra-constitutional rights enforceable in the courts irrespective of popular
majorities. It was first advanced by him in 1871 in the Legal Tender
Cases.2  He was then speaking, it should be noted, for a minority.
For acts of flagrant injustice [he wrote], there is no authority in any legis-
lative body; even though not restrained by an express constitutional prohibi-
tion. For as there are unchangeable principles of right and morality without
which society would be impossible, and men would be but wild beasts preying
upon each other, so there are fundamental principles of eternal justice,
upon the existence of which all constitutional government is founded, and
without which govermnent would be an intolerable and hateful tyranny.83
79 CooLEY, op. cit. supra. note 62, at 855, quoting from Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7
Cow. (N.Y.) 349, 351 (1827).
80 Euclid v. Ambler, supra, note 78, at 396.
siAn excellent and thoroughly readable biography is Carl Brent Swisher's
STEPnmN J. FfwLD, CR rTsmAN Or THE LAW (1940). See also Graham, Jitstice Field
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 52 YALE L.J. 852 (1943). On the general develop-
ment of constitutional law in the last part of the century, see Corvin, Social Plan-
ning Under the Constitution, 26 A_ .PoL.SC.REv. 1 (1932), and Mason, The Con-
servat'bve World of Mr. Justice Sutherland, 1883-1910, 32 Aw.Por,.SoI.Ruv. ,13
(1938).
82 12 Wall. 457, 20 L.Ed. 287 (1871).
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Two years later the Slaughter-House Cases 8" brought before the jus-
tices, for the first time, the Fourteenth Amendment. The result was a
decision announcing that, except in regard to recently liberated slaves,
the states' legislative power remained unimpaired. In a noteworthy dis-
sent,' Field protested that the rights of citizens were antecedent to the
creation of a state and could not "be destroyed by its power." The
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, if constitutional pro-
vision were needed, was to be construed as a substantive limitation on the
states. He developed this theory still further, again in dissent, in the
Munn case 8" three years later. By liberty, Field said, something more
was intended than "mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds
of a prison." It meant freedom
to act in such manner, not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as
[one's] judgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness; that is,
to pursue such callings and avocations as may be most suitable to develop
[one's] capacities, and give to them their highest enjoyment.8 7
Field's great quarrel with his brethren was really over the question of
judicial supremacy. Were judges bound to respect legislative determina-
tions of reasonableness, as Waite had indicated in the Munn case? In
the years immediately following that decision, it seemed that the answer
would continue to be in the affirmative. Indeed, the situation was such
that, as late as 1890, there was a demand for still further amendment
of the Constitution to the end that property rights should be rendered
secure from the threat of popular majorities."8 Relief came quickly
thereafter, however. In that very year, the first M11innesota Rate Case 89
was decided. By this decision, the Court claimed for the judiciary the
right to determine the ultimate reasonableness of utility rates. All pos-
sible doubt of the Court's intention to rule was erased in 1895 by the de-
cisions rendered in Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Company,9 United
States v. E. C. Knight Company," and In re Debs.
In the first of these cases, the Court heard Joseph Choate assail the
income tax as "communistic," and responded with the finding that it was
a direct tax and therefore invalid unless apportioned. Justice Field
84 16 Wall. 36, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873).
83 Id. at 83-111.
86 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 24 L.Ed. 77 (1877).
87 Id. at 142.
88 Marshall, A Tew Constitutional Amendment, 24 AMi.L.REv. 908 (1890).
89 Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 10 Sup.Ct. 702, 33 L.Ed.
970 (1890).
90 157 U.S. 429, 15 Sup.Ct. 673, 39 L.Ed. 759 (1895).
91156 U.S. 1, 15 Sup.Ct. 249, 39 L.Ed. 325 (1895).
92 158 U.S. 564, 15 Sup.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed. 1092 (1895).
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made known the Court's fear that this assault on capital was but the be-
ginning, that it would be "but the stepping stone to others, larger and
more sweeping, till our political contests will become a war of the poor
against the rich, a war constantly growing in intensity and bitterness." 03
Only three months before the Pollock case, the Court had occasion to
declare that the activities of the Sugar Trust were not subject to the-
power of Congress.. The result was the virtual nullification of the Sher-
man Act for more than a decade, and the curtailment of the commerce
power to the point of impotence.
The Debs case supplied the business community with protection from
interference originating in yet another quarter. There, in the absence of
a statute authorizing such procedure, the Court approved the issuance of
an injunction restraining Debs and the other leaders of the Pullman
strike of 1894 from interfering, by either speech or act, with the opera-
tion of the railroads. Justice Brewer, speaking for the Court, declared'
that "the strong arm of the National Government could be put forth to
brush away all obstructions to the freedom of interstate commerce." 04
The fact that the injunction had broken the strike was cited as proof
of "the wisdom of the course pursued by the Government." " Private.
employers were not slow to take the hint, and the injunction was sped
upon its notorious career in the "settlement" of labor disputes-a career
which abated only with the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932."
The result of the Court's vast extension of its powers was to endow
it, in some quarters at least, with a prestige it had not enjoyed since the
days of Marshall. More and more, the justices were called upon to deter-
mine tfie political destiny of the country. To all such invitations they
responded with an alacrity which discouraged any doubt of their superior
qualifications. The judges themselves, perhaps a little intoxicated by
their power and the homage paid them, were not inclined to be apologetic
for the new state of affairs. When Justice Field retired in 1897, he un-
blushingly reminded his brethren that they constituted the "safeguard
that keeps the whole mighty fabric of government from rushing to de-
struction." " And Justice Brewer, in 1893, could see no reason why
judges should not govern. The great body of them, he asserted,
93 Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 607, 15 Sup.Ct. 673, 39 L.
Ed. 759 (1895).
94 It re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 582, 15 Sup.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed. 1092 (1895). The ItalicA
are mine.
95 Id,. at 598.
96 47 STAT. 70-73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1946).
97 168 U.S. 717 (1897). Field sagely concluded, "This negative power, the power
of resistance, is the only safety of a popular government, and It is an additional
assurance when the power is in such hands as yours."
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-are as well versed in the affairs of life as any, and they who unravel all the
mysteries of accounting between partners, settle the business of the largest
.corporations and extract all the truth from the mass of sciolistic verbiage
-that falls from the lips of expert witnesses in patent cases, will have
no difficulty in determining what is right and wrong between employer and
employees, and whether proposed rates of freight and fare are reasonable
as between the public and the owners; while as for speed, is there anything
.quicker that a writ of injunction? 98
The wonders performed by the justices must have impressed Suther-
land as he watched the course of constitutional development. In law
.school, he had been 'assured 'that the sound and enlightened view, the
intellectually respectable view, was that of the minority. Now this
minority had converted itself into a majority. What better proof was
-needed of the wisdom of his teachers? One who began his law school
-career in 1932, fifty years after Sutherland, might well understand his
reaction. He, too, perhaps was told by some of his teachers that the
majority view was unsound, that the dissents of Holmes, Brandeis, Stone,
and Cardozo must prevail. Now that the revolution has been accom-
plished, he experiences the elation of having been one of the advance
guard. Almost certainly he concludes that his teachers had the answers.
For him, as for Sutherland, the tendency may be to ask whether the
-Court has not finally reached a good, safe resting place.
There is other evidence, considerably less speculative, that the Court
-of 1895 impressed itself on Sutherland's consciousness. His entire sub-
:sequent career confirms the fact. For him, as for the justices, popular
.government, unrestrained by judges, was unthinkable and sure to result
in self-obliteration. He absorbed not only this Court's general outlook
but its particular conception of federalism, liberty, and property. In
1909 he explicitly asserted his high opinion of the 1895 Court. Its
members, he declared, "were as magnificently equipped in learning and
ability as any who have sat in that august tribunal before or since";
moreover, if, in the Pollock case, they appeared to set at naught prior
rulings of a hundred years, it was but the correction of a century of
error. 
9
VI
How faithfully, in later years, Sutherland followed the teachings of
Maeser, Campbell, Cooley, and the 1895 Court is apparent. A final word
remains to be said of some of the early manifestations of the influence
of the three school men. On leaving Michigan in 1883, Sutherland prac-
98 Quoted in ALpiEUS T. Af&soz\,, BRAXDEIS, A FRE. IAN's LIFE 102 (1946).
9944 CONG.MEC. 2096 (1909).
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ticed law in Utah until his election to the House of Representatives in
1900. His experiences followed the familiar pattern of the successful
frontier lawyer. In 1894, he was one of the organizers of the Utah State
Bar Association. The next year he was one of the speakers at the annual
meeting.
His subject was "The Selection, Tenure, and Compensation of the
Judiciary." 100 In addition to recommendations on each of these issues,
the speech contained some interesting revelations of Sutherland's early
conception of the nature of law and of the judicial function. To bolster
his argument for an indeterminate tenure for the judiciary, Sutherland
adduced a comparison of its task with that of the legislature. Legisla-
tors, he explained, must always be concerned with the "changing needs
and views of the people" and should reflect these changes. A wholly dif-
ferent situation was said to obtain with the judiciary. "Judges," he said,
"do not make laws, but declare them; the rules which govern their de-
liberations and decisions are to a large extent fixed and permanent, in
no wise to be controlled by temporary considerations or policies." This
being true, the judge of one era could easily satisfy the demands of an-
other. Even so great a legislator as Daniel Webster "would stand aghast
in the attempt to legislate for the people of the present day"; but an
eminent jurist like Chancellor Kent could be transplanted with ease. He
would be able, merely "by reading the statutes which have been enacted
since his death" to "serve the commonwealth quite as well as any of the
present incumbents" ! 101
The mission of the judiciary also came in for review. The judicial
department was said to stand "as a shield to prevent the exercise of op-
pressive and arbitrary power on the part of the government itself, whose
creature it is, against the citizen, though never so humble or insignificant.
Its duty is to protect the individual against the unjust demands of sod-
ety." "' Since their function was to "declare and apply the law," courts
frequently had "the solemn duty to disregard the wishes and sentiments
of a majority of the people and declare in favor of the position of a single
individual" as against the whole world.' Hence the judicial department
"is and should be the strongest" branch of the government.
As a young lawyer, Sutherland devoted much time to the usual extra-
legal activities. He made patriotic addresses and took part in local poli-
tics. Even before his admission to the bar, he had identified himself
with the "Liberal" Party.' This party had its origin in the non-Mor-
100 2 REP. UTAhi BAR Ass',N 47 (1895).
101 Id. at 57.
102 I. at 47.
03 Id. at 48.
104 T. MARnMUS TENSEN, HISTORY OF PROVO, UTAH 188 (1924).
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mons' reaction to the closed, equalitarian, cooperative economy developed
by the Church in the years after 1868.1°5 Some indication of the party's
program is furnished by its Congressional candidate's letter accepting the
nomination in 1876. "I desire," the aspirant wrote, "the establishment of
the supremacy of law, freedom of thought, freedom of speech and free-
dom of action in Utah-to establish a system under which everyone may
freely and fully exercise his own individuality, choose his own business,
political, and social relations." 106
After the death of Brigham Young in 1877 the Mormon economy be-
gan to lose its equalitarian emphasis. Ownership was allowed to become
centralized. The barrier to trade with lion-Mormons was removed. By
1890 the process was completed. As Bernard De Voto says, "Israel had
to make terms with finance," and hence developed "not in the direction
of Rochdale, New Harmony, the Oneida community, Brook Farm, the
United Order or the Kingdom of God-but in the direction of Standard
Oil." 107 Also in 1890, the Church prohibited any further contracting of
polygamous marriages. With these developments, the Liberal party went
out of existence and Sutherland promptly became an active Republican.
Of Sutherland's early political utterances, one is of interest even to-
day. It reveals the essential identity of the mind of the twenty-four-
year-old attorney of 1886 with that of the Supreme Court Justice of
1937. The city council of Provo, in the face of a clearly preponderant
opposing sentiment, had issued licenses for the sale of liquor. For this
disregard of the popular will the councilmen were soundly berated by the
city newspaper. Sutherland defended them with a reply reminiscent of
Burke. The city fathers, he explained, were under no obligation to heed
the voice of the people. Indeed, they should not. They had only to
satisfy "their own consciences and their own reason of the rightfulness,
policy, justice, consistency and legality of any contemplated legislation."
When they had done this, he concluded, they could, "with a good deal
of propriety, invoke Mr. Vanderbilt's somewhat profane and summary
disposition of a stiff-necked and upappreciative public." 108
105 A. good account of the rise of the Liberal Party may be found In n. W.
BASKIN, RmnNISCENSES OF EARLY UTAiX (1914). What I have to say about the
Mormon economy is drawn principally from Gardner, Cooperation Anmong the
Mormons, 31 Q.,.EcoN. 461-503 (1917).
106 BASKIN, op. cit. supra, at 25.
107 F OlUyS ANl REBUTTALS 122 (1936).
10s Territorial Inquirer (Provo), Dec. 10, 1886. Cf. the following from Suther-
land's dissenting opinion in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 401-402,
57 Sup.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703 (1937): "It has been pointed out many times . . .
that this judicial duty [that of passing on the constitutionality of a statute] is
one of gravity and delicacy; and that rational doubts must be resolved in favor
of the constitutionality of the statutes. But whose doubts, and by whom re-
solved? Undoubtedly it is the duty of a member of the court . . . to give
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The first phase of Sutherland's career may be said to have ended in
1900 when he first sought and won national political office. By that year
his education was complete. There were, of course, details here and there
to be filled in, but he had accumulated the intellectual resources on which
he was to draw in the years which lay ahead. Maeser, Campbell, Cooley,
and the Supreme Court of the United States all had contributed to the
process. Had they allied themselves beforehand, they could hardly have
produced a more nearly perfect harmony.
A perfect harmony, however, was not essential to their influence.
Sutherland followed even when there was an aberration from the central
theme. Four years after Sutherland's death, one writer 09 assumed the
task of explaining the Justice's startling departure in the Curtiss-Wright
case from the rigorous constitutionalism which characterized all his other
efforts. He discovered that Sutherland had articulated his theory of the
foreign relations power as early as 1909,"0 and had reiterated it in his
Blumenthal lectures at Columbia a decade later."' The writer concluded
that "the whole theory and a great amount of its phraseology had become
engraved on Mr. Sutherland's mind before he joined the Court." 112 In-
deed it had. We can now add that a teacher, James Valentine Campbell,
began the engraving on October 9, 1882.
due weight to the opposing views of his associates; but In the end, the question
which he must answer is not whether such views seem sound to those who en-
tertain them, but whether they convince him that the statute Is constitutional or
engender in his mind a rational doubt upon that issue. The oath which he takes
as a judge is not a composite oath, but an individual one. And In passing upon
the validity of a statute, he discharges a duty Imposed upon him . . . If upon
a question so important he thus surrender his deliberate judgment, he stands for-
sworn. He cannot subordinate his convictions to that extent and keep faith with
his oath or retain his judicial and moral independence."
109 Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Ruther.
la's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946).
110 Sutherland, The Internal a2u Eoternal Powers of the NationaZ Govenmnent,
SEiq.Doc. No. 417, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1909).
ll CoNsTiTumoxAL Powp_ AwD WORLD A.FFAn1S (1919). I might add that It was
Sutherland's enthusiastic praise of Campbell In this work, and In that cited In the
note above, that led me to suspect his great Importance. In both places, Suther-
land leans heavily on Campbell's opinion in Van Husan v. Kanouse, 13 Mich. 303,
313 (1865). There it is argued that a power essential to government but prohibited
to the states must of necessity be in the national government.
312 Levitan, supra note 109, at 478. '
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